The Rising Threat of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”

In 2014, reports suggested that a surge of foreign jihadists were participating in armed conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. The United Nations Security Council responded by imposing in Resolution 2178 (2014) an array of obligations on member states to counter the threat posed by “foreign terrorist fighters” (FTFs). In the intervening year, those states have taken a range of actions—though at various speeds and with varying levels of commitment—to implement the FTF obligations imposed by the Council.

Supporting Principled Humanitarian Action in Counterterrorism Contexts

Meanwhile, many states continue to fund and otherwise throw their support behind life-saving humanitarian relief for civilians in armed conflicts around the world—including conflicts involving terrorists. Yet, in recent years, members of the humanitarian community have been increasingly aware of the real, perceived, and potential impacts of counterterrorism laws on humanitarian action. Part of their interest stems from the fact that certain counterterrorism laws may, intentionally or unintentionally, adversely affect principled humanitarian action, especially in regions where terrorist groups control territory (and thus access to civilians, too). The effects of these laws may be widespread—ranging from heightened due diligence requirements on humanitarian organizations to restrictions on travel, from greater government scrutiny of national and regional staff of humanitarian organizations to decreased access to financial services and funding. Counterterrorism measures may also in principle give rise to a “chilling effect” on humanitarian action. That is, humanitarian actors may choose not to undertake life-saving relief schemes that they otherwise would due to fears of violating counterterrorism laws and policies.

Given the awareness of the risks of counterterrorism laws and regulations to humanitarian action by the time Resolution 2178 was passed, one might have expected the Security Council and states to incorporate explicit and specific protections for humanitarian action, or to reaffirm expressly their commitment to humanitarian action in areas controlled by listed entities. This did not occur in Resolution 2178. One reason might be that those involved in crafting the resolution and those on the counterterrorism portfolios were not involved in the same discussions as those from the humanitarian or aid divisions. The Security Council did, however, expressly require that U.N. member states prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting, or equipping of FTFs consistent with international humanitarian law (IHL). In doing so, the Council implicitly required states to discharge their FTF obligations in a manner that respects the various forms of humanitarian action protected by IHL. The Security Council did not, however, expressly require that states discharge each of the other key FTF obligations entailed in the resolution consistent with IHL.

After foregrounding the normative and operational frameworks, we note that FTF-related counterterrorism measures—following a long line of measures implementing increasingly robust anti-terrorism agendas—may have the capacity to adversely affect certain aspects of principled humanitarian action. Our research suggests, however, that more documentation from humanitarian organizations would be needed to firmly establish a systemic adverse impact of FTF-related counterterrorism measures on principled humanitarian action. We also note that the FTF framing by the Security Council may present a particularly strong opportunity for meaningful engagement between counterterrorism and humanitarian actors.

In addition, we submit an analytical methodology aimed at ascertaining from an empirical perspective how (certain select) states have implemented the FTF-related obligations imposed by the Security Council in Resolution 2178 (2014) one year after its adoption. We also put forward a methodology aimed at ascertaining from an empirical perspective whether those same states are supporting—or, at least, not actively curtailing—humanitarian aid and assistance, especially in relation to conflicts involving FTFs and other terrorists. This section also offers provisional figures generated from the application of these methodologies to extant sources. In doing so, we develop—and invite critical feedback on—new ways to measure both of these areas of state practice.

Opportunities and Concerns for Principled Humanitarian Organizations

Today, the overall political and operational environment for principled humanitarian action appears to be marked by increasingly aggressive counterterrorism responses. It may well be that donor states, states in the region, and states with comparatively greater numbers of FTFs experience the FTF threat as presenting a different order of national security concern than does terrorism more generally. Perhaps particularly in light of recent ISIS developments, refugee influxes into Europe, and al-Qaeda calling for lone-perpetrator attacks in the West, state responses appear to be tipping increasingly towards national security. These changing political realities should inform how humanitarian organizations understand the potential for additional changes to the regulatory environment. In particular, on the horizon there are six areas humanitarian actors should be particularly aware of and engaged with:

Recommendations to Strengthen Evidence-based Decision-making

How could a better understanding of the relevant trends and trajectories—in state responses to the threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters, in state support of principled humanitarian action in counterterrorism contexts, and, especially, in the potential intersections between those areas of state practice—be established? Four areas may be particularly impactful to focus on in the current environment:


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