Radhika Kapoor, “A Primer on Subsidiary Bodies of Sanctions Committees Established by the U.N. Security Council,” HLS PILAC UNSC Primer Series, Nov. 2024

Executive Summary

Under Article 29 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council “may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.” Of the subsidiary organs established by the Security Council, sanctions committees—mandated with administering the sanctions regimes decided by the Security Council—are among the most active. The Security Council has established subsidiary bodies of those sanctions committees (SBSCs) to assist in monitoring the effective implementation of sanctions. SBSCs include groups of experts, panels of experts, and monitoring teams.

This document offers a primer on certain key aspects of SBSCs. As of June 2024, there are nine SBSCs supporting ten of the 14 currently active sanctions committees. The proliferation of SBSCs began in the 1990s, with the recognition that, alongside the Security Council’s imposition of sanctions regimes, there was a need for independent mechanisms to monitor those sanctions. These monitoring mechanisms were meant to serve as impartial sources of information, document violations, and offer recommendations to assist sanctions committees in ensuring the effective implementation of Council-decided sanctions regimes.

SBSCs are staffed by individuals with specialized knowledge or expertise. The mandate, size, and duration of each SBSC are typically determined by the Security Council. SBSCs’ mandates often entail assisting their respective sanctions committees with discharging their responsibilities, including by: collecting information on the implementation of sanctions; identifying and investigating alleged violations; providing updated information in respect of designated individuals and entities; recommending names of potential designees; apprising their respective sanctions committees of designated individuals who have died and of designated entities that have become defunct; and providing recommendations to improve the design and implementation of sanctions measures.

In U.N. classification, SBSCs are characterized as “special political missions” and are understood as “subsidiary organs” of the Security Council within the meaning of Article 29 of the U.N. Charter. SBSCs typically operate under the direction of their respective sanctions committees and are administratively supported by the U.N. Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. Individual experts serving on SBSCs are hired as consultants rather than as U.N. staff, with a view to preserving their independence and impartiality. Accordingly, their conditions of service differ significantly from those of regular U.N. officials—a circumstance that has been criticized as potentially constraining the U.N. Secretariat’s ability to hire the best talent to serve on SBSCs. Conversely, it has been contended that SBSCs’ dependency on the U.N. for certain forms of support may undercut their ability to act independently and impartially. 

Rather than a systematic set of codified rules, SBSCs follow ad hoc and flexible working methods, including with respect to evidentiary standards. SBSCs appear to rely on a combination of tools to collect information and document sanctions violations, including conducting field investigations, liaising with U.N. Member States, interviewing alleged violators, reviewing databases and secondary sources, and cooperating with other entities, as relevant.

A number of challenges concerning the functioning of SBSCs may be identified, including in connection with: the safety and security of SBSC members; the level and quality of support provided to SBSCs by the U.N. Secretariat; inconsistent cooperation from U.N. Member States; undue interference by U.N. Member States; inconsistent working methods and a potential lack of due process; and non-implementation of SBSC recommendations.

About This Primer Series

Despite the extraordinary authority placed in the United Nations Security Council, relatively little is known about its day-to-day workings outside its five permanent members and UN support staff. Indeed, the permanent members benefit from decades of continuous experience, as well as relatively large teams in New York and at their respective capitals devoted to international law and policy matters. Members elected for a two-year term at the Council often do not possess equivalent expertise, resources, and personnel. In a series of primers, HLS PILAC seeks to help fill an arguable informational gap concerning international law and the Council between the permanent and elected members. Building off a 2020 general primer for elected members published by HLS PILAC, these new analyses are intended to furnish elected members with important additional information that they can use as they see fit. The primary target audience includes current and future elected members of the Council, in particular those States’ legal and policy advisers. The series’ objective is not to proscribe or prescribe particular approaches but, rather, to apprise States of certain key issues that may be borne in mind in navigating engagements with and at the Security Council.